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We study illiquidity in the ASEAN-5 sovereign bond markets from 2008 to 2019 by 
using an illiquidity measure, which is based on a proxy of the amount of arbitrage 
capital available in sovereign bond markets. Our analysis identifies three drivers of 
illiquidity in Singapore, namely economic policy uncertainty, the default spread and the 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate. In contrast, illiquidity of all other markets 
is mostly not characterized by economic drivers. It appears that overall liquidity is 
lower in the markets outside Singapore and therefore deviations in the yield curves 
are higher on average and arbitrage eliminates larger deviations not immediately but 
in a delayed manner.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Price deviations in the yield curve of the U.S. Treasury market are able to reflect 
liquidity of varying origins and magnitudes (Hu et al., 2013). However, the U.S. 
Treasury market is very unique in several dimensions, which distinguishes this 
bond market from others, like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
sovereign bond markets.1 Therefore, additional research in other sovereign bond 
markets can provide new insights into liquidity and fixed-income arbitrage. In 
addition, it is important to understand the characteristics of bond liquidity as 
it is one of the major drivers of sovereign bond yields (Kinateder and Wagner, 
2017). The ASEAN sovereign bond markets are geographically and economically 
different from the U.S., and there is a lack of research in the area of ASEAN bond 
liquidity (Tripathi et al., 2020), which motivates us to analyze how liquidity events 
transmit through price deviation in the yield curve outside the U.S.
In this paper, we use a bond market-specific illiquidity measure proposed 
by Hu et al. (2013) to study illiquidity in the ASEAN-5 sovereign fixed income 
markets. This illiquidity (noise) measure is based on the intuition that the level 
of illiquidity in fixed income markets and the arbitrage capital available in these 
markets are closely related. During tranquil periods, arbitrageurs usually have no 
shortage of capital, therefore, market prices are closer to their fundamental value 
as above average-price deviations are immediately corrected by arbitrageurs. 
In times of market stress, there is usually a lack of arbitrage capital as falling 
prices force arbitrageurs to provide additional funds or securities (e.g. due to 
a margin call), which can lead to significant differences between market prices 
and their fundamental values. Therefore, Hu et al. (2013) argue that transitory 
price deviations (the so-called “noise”) in the bond market contain important 
information about how liquidity evolves over time in fixed income markets. 
Our focus lies on the five founding countries of the ASEAN, namely Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. We first estimate monthly 
yield curves for each of the five ASEAN sovereign bond markets. Then, based on 
these results, we calculate the noise measure for each country’s sovereign bond 
market. Finally, we apply a multiple time series regression using a comprehensive 
set of explanatory variables to identify the drivers of illiquidity in the ASEAN-5 
sovereign bond markets. The country-specific explanatory variables include 
the country’s local equity market return, the gold return in local currency, the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate and the inflation rate. In addition, we 
account for common explanatory variables, namely the corporate bond spread (as 
a proxy for the aggregate credit cycle), economic policy uncertainty, implied bond 
volatility, the steepness of the riskless Singapore term structure, and the Chicago 
Board Option Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX).
Our results show that illiquidity conditions in Singapore’s sovereign bond 
market follow our expectations, where noise (illiquidity) jumps during the global 
financial crisis and fluctuates on a very low level afterwards. In contrast, the 
1 The U.S. market is one of the most liquid and the largest sovereign bond market in the world. In Q4 
2019, the market size of the U.S. sovereign bond market was 19,710 billion USD compared to 816 
billion USD in ASEAN-5 countries (Sources: Bank of International Settlement; Asian Development 
Bank).
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noise results of the other ASEAN-5 sovereign bond markets are characterized 
by a significant negative autocorrelation and mostly not by economic drivers. 
Moreover, noise in these bond markets is significantly higher during tranquil 
periods as compared to Singapore. The difference between Singapore and the 
remaining ASEAN-5 markets could be due to several reasons. 
Firstly, Singapore has the strongest credit rating on sovereign bonds 
throughout the entire sample period and can, therefore, be treated as a safe haven. 
All other ASEAN-5 sovereign bond markets are rated weaker. As a result, there 
could be a flight-to-quality effect within the ASEAN-5 sovereign bond markets. 
Secondly, Singapore is a global financial centre and, thus, spill-overs from other 
financial centres, such as the U.S., affect this country more than other countries, 
which have a different economic focus. Thirdly, arbitrageurs also account for other 
factors than noise such as the basic level of liquidity. Lower basic liquidity in the 
ASEAN-5 markets outside Singapore as well as the lower credit rating of these 
markets might reduce the number of international arbitrageurs. Thus, a higher 
level of basic liquidity in Singapore’s sovereign market could also explain why in 
tranquil periods small deviations in this yield curve are eliminated by arbitrage 
immediately, while there are a delayed reaction and higher yield curve deviations 
in the other markets. 
Moreover, we identify three drivers of illiquidity for Singapore’s sovereign 
bond market. The main driver is the corporate bond spread (as a proxy for the 
aggregate credit cycle), while at the same time an increase in economic policy 
uncertainty and declines in the aggregate business cycle (proxied by GDP growth 
rate), significantly drive sovereign bond illiquidity in Singapore. Our results also 
indicate that price deviations in Singapore’s yield curve contain unique country-
specific information. Lastly, we find that our explanatory variables can explain 
illiquidity jumps during a market-wide illiquidity event but not the fluctuation of 
noise on a low level in tranquil periods.
This paper is related to the existing literature in several dimensions. First, it 
relates to the literature on how the amount of arbitrage capital in a specific market 
affects the effectiveness of arbitrage forces, or “limits of arbitrage”, and possible 
price deviations (see e.g., Leland and Rubinstein 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Duffie, 2010). Musto 
et al. (2015) find a large and systematic mispricing during the global financial 
crisis between notes and bonds with identical cash flows. Mitchell and Pulvino 
(2012) provide a detailed and informative account of the financing of hedge funds 
during the global financial crisis and its potential implications for asset prices. 
More recently, Fleckenstein et al. (2014) document a large increase of mispricing 
between Treasury bonds and inflation-swapped Treasury inflation-protected 
securities during the 2008 global financial crisis. Second, the paper is related to the 
literature applying the noise measure of Hu et al. (2013) to sovereign bond markets 
as recommended by Durham (2015). Moinas et al. (2018) apply several illiquidity 
measures in a joint setting to the European sovereign bond market. Their empirical 
results show that market illiquidity shocks tighten funding constraints. For the 
Japanese sovereign bond market, Hattori (2019) documents a significant jump of 
noise during the global financial crisis, which provides some evidence that the 
illiquidity measure captures market-wide illiquidity shocks. Third, this paper is 
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related to the literature identifying potential drivers of illiquidity (see e.g. Goyenko 
et al., 2011; Helwege et al., 2014; Adrian et al., 2017; Chung and Chuwonganant, 
2018). Lastly, it is also related to the literature dealing with the relationship 
between sovereign bond yields and illiquidity (see e.g. Kinateder and Wagner, 
2017; Kinateder et al., 2017). Our study contributes to this literature by thoroughly 
analysing illiquidity in the ASEAN-5 sovereign bond markets using a recently 
published liquidity proxy, which is explicitly designed for fixed-income markets. 
In addition, we not only focus on country-specific differences in illiquidity, but 
also study to which extent the respective bond market’s illiquidity is related to 
various economic variables. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the 
methodology for curve fitting, estimating illiquidity (noise) and identifying drivers 
of illiquidity. Section III describes the sample data and contains the explanatory 
variables as well as a description of their theoretical relation to the illiquidity 
measure. Section IV conducts an analysis of the empirical results for curve fitting, 
noise and illiquidity drivers. Section V provides implications of our findings for 
investors. Finally, Section VI concludes. 
II. METHODOLOGY
A. Construction of the Illiquidity Measure
The construction of the illiquidity measure is based on the approach of Hu et al. 
(2013). We calculate the illiquidity measure, Noisejm, in country j at month m using 
the root mean square error:
(1)
where Njm is the number of government bonds available in country j in month 
m, yijm is the market yield of bond i, and yîj(bjm) is the respective model-implied 
yield of bond i in country j in month m.2 We use the well-known Svensson 
(1994) approach to estimate the model-implied yield curve.3 Therefore, we have 
bjm=(βjm,0,βjm,1,βjm,2,βjm,3,τjm,1,τjm,2), where βjm,0,βjm,0+βjm,1,τjm,1, and τjm,2 must be positive. 
The parameter vector bjm of the Svensson (1994) approach is obtained by minimizing 
the weighted sum of squared deviations ξjm between the model-implied and the 
empirically observable prices:
2 The market yield is calculated numerically based on the observed market prices and the future cash 
flows of the corresponding bond i in country j in month m.
3 Alternative methods may be applied. Lapshin (2019), for example, proposes a Bayesian non-
parametric framework that addresses aspects of the shapes of yield curves including those of 
emerging markets.
(2)
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where  denotes the model-implied price for bond i in country j in month 
m,Pijm is the observable market price of bond i in country j in month m, and Dijm is 
the Macaulay duration for bond i in country j in month m. The price deviations 
are weighted by the inverse of Macaulay’s bond duration to guarantee that they 
are efficiently minimized in the yield space. In contrast to the direct minimization 
of the yield space, this method has the benefit that it avoids large computing costs 
that are necessary for the numerical conversion of prices into yields (Hu et al., 
2013). We use the method of generalized reduced gradients to minimize Eq. (2).
B. Drivers of Illiquidity 
To study the drivers of illiquidity in the ASEAN-5 sovereign bond markets, we run 
a multiple time series regression for each country. We regress the first differences 
of the estimated noise on a comprehensive set of explanatory variables to identify 
the impact of potential drivers on monthly changes in noise:
where ∆ denotes the first difference operator, Noisejm is the noise measure 
given in Eq. (1) for country j in month m. The vectors  and 
 contain a set of k+1 explanatory variables and regression 
coefficients for each country j, respectively. The unexplained variation in the noise 
measure is denoted by εjm, where .
III. DATA 
In this section, we introduce the data used for curve fitting and estimating the noise 
measure. Moreover, we describe our explanatory variables used in the multiple 
regression and their theoretical relation to the noise measure.
A. Sovereign Bonds
We use monthly sovereign bond data for five ASEAN market countries, namely 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream. We set the time frame for our sample from January 2008 
to January 2019 because, for most of the analyzed bond markets, there is not 
enough data available before 2008. For Malaysia, there is no bond-specific data 
available before August 2009, thus the Malaysian sample starts on this time point. 
In order to ensure a comparable sample, we use bonds which are non-callable, 
non-flower, and with no special tax treatment. We assume observations with 
negative prices or yields as well as yields larger than 30% as measurement errors 
and therefore exclude them from the sample. Since the number of bonds declared 
as measurement errors are negligible compared to the total number of bonds this 
should not affect our estimation. Bonds with remaining maturities less than one 
month are dropped from the sample, due to potential liquidity problems. We also 
remove bonds with maturity larger than 30 years as our sample only consists of 
(3)
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a few such observations. Furthermore, we only consider bonds that are issued in 
the local currency. 
On average, we have 35 bonds for Indonesia, 30 for Malaysia, 69 for the 
Philippines, 15 for Singapore, and 39 for Thailand with maturity between one 
month and 30 years. Contrary, Hu et al. (2013) use bonds and bills from one 
month to ten years for yield curve fitting and bonds from one year to ten years for 
estimating the noise measure.4 They argue that the short end of the yield curve is 
known to be noisier than other parts of the yield curve. Moreover, the short end is 
unlikely to be the object of arbitrage capital, which is the main motivation of the 
noise measure. Bonds with long maturity might suffer from instable supply, and 
thus could introduce unnecessary time-series noise to the measure. 
B. Explanatory Variables of Sovereign Bond Illiquidity
This section contains a description of our explanatory variables and their theoretical 
relation to our estimated noise measure. The explanatory variables are grouped in 
common and country-specific variables.
B1. Common Variables
Corporate Bond Spread: The difference between the Moody’s Aaa and Baa-rated 
corporate bond yields is commonly regarded as default spread. A decline in the 
credit supply leads to a decline in asset values, an increase in incentives to default, 
and a widening of yield spreads on private debt instruments of the economic 
downturn as lenders demand compensation for the expected increase in defaults 
(Gilchrist et al., 2009). Given this logic, the corporate bond spread can also be 
interpreted as a proxy for the aggregate credit cycle (Adrian et al., 2017). Although 
the empirical results are all related to the U.S. market, we assume the corporate 
bond spread as an indicator for global systemic risk, involving the ASEAN-5 
market. Given the above results, we expect a positive relation between changes in 
the corporate bond spread, ∆CBSm, and noise changes. 
Economic Policy Uncertainty: Several studies show that uncertainty reduces 
liquidity provision in financial markets (see e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 
2009; Nagel, 2012). For example, increased uncertainty may induce additional 
risk premium requirements, which could force market makers to withdraw 
liquidity provision from the market. Baker et al. (2016) propose a monthly index of 
economic policy uncertainty (EPU) that reflects the frequency of articles in leading 
newspapers containing a trio of terms pertaining to the economy, uncertainty, and 
policy-related matters. Davis (2016) constructs a monthly index of global economic 
policy uncertainty (GEPU), which is a GDP-weighted average of national EPU 
indices for 21 countries that account for roughly 80% of global output at market 
4 If we used the same data criteria as Hu et al. (2013), we would need to shrink the estimation period 
for most of the countries even further. As a result, we could not construct the noise measure during 
the global financial crisis, which would make our results less interpretable. Lastly, due to the low 
number of bond observations, observed maturities do not fully cover the estimation period of the 
estimated yield curves from one month to 30 years. The “gaps” within the estimation period might 
affect the reliability of curve fitting.
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exchange rates. We use the GEPU index to model economic policy uncertainty for 
the countries Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Given the above 
empirical and theoretical results, we expect a positive relation between changes 
in global economic policy uncertainty, ∆EPUm, and noise changes. For Singapore, 
we use changes in its economic policy uncertainty index, , as Singapore 
is an international financial center and the most developed country within the 
ASEAN-5 group.
Implied Bond Volatility: To measure implied bond volatility, we use the CBOE 
10-year U.S. Treasury Note Volatility Index (TYVIX), calculated and published by 
the Chicago Board Option Exchange (CBOE).5 The TYVIX measures a constant 30-
day expected volatility of 10-year Treasury Note futures prices and is calculated 
based on transparent pricing from Chicago Board of Trade’s (CBOT) actively traded 
options on the Treasury Note futures. As there are no publicly available sovereign 
bond volatility indexes of the ASEAN-5 market, we use implied volatility in the 
U.S. Treasury market to proxy this indicator. Since existing literature provides 
empirical evidence of a negative relation between volatility and liquidity (see e.g., 
Engle et al., 2012; Adrian et al., 2017), we expect increases (decreases) in implied 
bond volatility, ∆BondVm, to be associated with an increase (decrease) in noise.
Term Structure Slope: We use differences between the 10-year and 2-year 
Singapore sovereign bond yield to calculate the riskless term structure slope. 
Since Singapore is the only country in the ASEAN-5 market, which has the 
highest possible rating on sovereign bonds (Aaa), we use its term structure slope 
for all countries. The existing literature finds that the slope of the yield curve has 
significant predictive power in explaining business cycle fluctuations (see e.g., 
Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; Rudebusch and Williams, 2009). An increase in the 
slope of the term structure is a common indicator of prospective economic growth 
(see e.g., Fama and French, 1989; Martell, 2008; Iyke, 2017). Following this logic, a 
steeper slope may indicate a growing economy leading to higher liquidity in the 
market. Consequently, we would expect a positive relation between ∆Slopem and 
noise changes. 
VIX: The CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) is a popular measure of the stock 
market’s expectation of volatility, which is also known as “fear index” or “fear 
gauge” (see e.g., Whaley, 2000; Simon and Wiggins, 2001; Whaley, 2009). Moreover, 
there is some evidence that VIX is a cross-market fear gauge. An increase in VIX 
suppresses returns of the sock markets in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand during the U.S. subprime crisis (Abduhl-Rahman and 
Sidek, 2011; Lim, 2009). In addition, Bao et al. (2011) show that monthly changes 
in aggregate bond market liquidity are strongly related to changes in VIX. Since 
market illiquidity increases when VIX increases, a positive (negative) change in 
VIX, i.e. ∆VIXm, should be associated with increasing (decreasing) noise. 
5 Adrian et al. (2017) use the Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate index (MOVE) to calculate 
implied Treasury volatility. MOVE data is not are not available publicly, therefore we use the TYVIX. 
As both indexes measure implied volatility in the Treasury market and the CBOE is a well-known 
provider of volatility indexes (e.g. VIX), we also assume the TYVIX as a reliable measure. 
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B2. Country-specific Variables
Local Equity Market Return: The return of the local equity index is an indicator 
of the country-specific business climate. During times of market turmoil, stock 
prices are informative linkages between the real and financial sides of economy, 
due to their forward-looking nature. Chung and Chuwonganant (2018) show that 
during crisis periods lower stock returns do not just arise from greater expected 
risk premiums but also from greater expected illiquidity premiums. Moreover, 
the authors provide evidence that stock’s return is more sensitive to unexpected 
changes in volatility when liquidity disappears. Following this logic, we expect 
a negative relationship between changes in local equity market returns, REjm, 
and changes in noise. The local monthly compounding equity market returns 
are calculated by using monthly closing prices from the following equity market 
indexes: IDX Composite (Indonesia), KLCI 30 (Malaysia), PSE 30 (the Philippines), 
STI 30 (Singapore), and SET 100 (Thailand).6 
Local Gold Return: Gold is a prominent safe haven, while also being a risky 
asset. However, the function of gold as safe haven in the ASEAN market literature 
is scarce. According to Ziaei (2012), gold can act as a hedge against equity, but 
their results show that the gold price cannot be considered as a safe haven in the 
ASEAN +3 market.7 Contrary, the results of a more recent study from Nguyen et 
al. (2016), using a mixed-copula approach, show that gold may be a safe haven 
asset during a market crash for Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, but not for 
Indonesia and the Philippines. Despite opposing results from existing literature, 
we use the local gold return, RGjm, as an explanatory variable and expect a positive 
relationship between the local gold return and changes in noise, as an increase 
in noise indicates the need for a safe haven. The gold returns are calculated for 
each country using the London gold bullion market’s monthly gold fixing prices 
previously converted into local currency. 
GDP Growth Rate: Following the intuition of Hu et al. (2013), which we use to 
calculate our liquidity measure, a downturn in the overall economy could lead to a 
deterioration in arbitrage capital, and, thus, increase illiquidity. Contrary, during 
a normal business cycle there should be plenty of arbitrage available leading to 
a low level of illiquidity. As a result, we control for GDP growth as growth in 
the aggregate output of an economy. Since GDP statistics are available only at 
a quarterly frequency, we use linear interpolation (see e.g., Adrian et al., 2017) 
to obtain the monthly GDP level for each country. Based on the GDP level, we 
calculate the monthly GDP growth rate. We expect a negative relation between 
relative change in the GDP growth rate, ΔGDPjm, and the noise measure.
Inflation Rate: We also consider the inflation rate, measured by the monthly 
relative changes in the local consumer price index (CPI). Referring to the logic 
of the Phillips curve, inflation controls for the output gap and future price level 
expectations of an economy. We expect that the relative change in the inflation 
rate, ΔInflationjm, is negatively related to changes in the noise measure.
6 The abbreviations have the following meaning: Indonesia Stock Exchange Composite (IDX 
Composite), Kuala Lumpur Composite Index 30 (KLCI 30), Philippine Stock Exchange Composite 
Index 30 (PSE 30), FTSE Straits Times Index 30 (STI 30) and Stock Exchange of Thailand Index (SET 
100). 
7 In Ziaei’s (2012) study, the ASEAN +3 market includes five ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) as well as China, Japan and South Korea.
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Table 1 summarizes the explanatory variables and provides the data sources as 
well as expected effect on changes in the noise measure.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we first present and discuss the results of the sovereign bond 
illiquidity measure Noisejm for each ASEAN country, including the yield curve 
fitting process as a main part of illiquidity estimation. Then, we examine the ability 
of several common variables (∆CBSm, ∆EPUm, ∆BondVm, ∆Slopem, and ∆VIXm) as 
well as country-specific variables (∆EPUmSing, REjm, RGjm, ΔGDPjm, and ΔInflationjm) 
to explain changes in the noise measure.
A. Curve Fitting Results
In this section, we present some exemplary results of fitted yield curves using the 
Svensson (1994) approach. For this purpose, we plot several examples of model-
implied yield curves as lines and the market observed bond yields, marked by “+”, 
“o” or “x” for each ASEAN-5 country in Figure 1. For each country, three different 
months are shown: One month during the global financial crisis represented by 
November 2008 “+” and two random months, September 2014 “o” and April 2017 
Table 1. 
Definition of Explanatory Variables
This table contains a summary of the explanatory variables including their expected sign and the data source.
Variable
Description Source Expected Sign
Panel A: Common variables
∆CBSm
Changes in the corporate bond spread 
(Moody’s Baa-Aaa corporate bond yields) FRED +
∆EPUm





Changes in the CBOE 10-year U.S. 
Treasury Note Volatility Index (TYVIX) CBOE +
∆Slopem
Slope of the Singapore sovereign bond 
yield curve
Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS) +
∆VIXm
Changes in the CBOE Volatility Index 
(VIX) CBOE +
Panel B: Country-specific variables
∆EPUmSing





Local equity market Return: 
IDX Composite (Indonesia), KLCI 30 
(Malaysia), PSE 30 (Philippines), STI 30 
(Singapore) and SET 100 (Thailand)
Thomson Reuters Eikon -
RGjm Gold return in local currency FRED, Yahoo Finance +
∆GDPjm Relative changes in GDP levels Thomson Reuters Eikon -
∆Inflationjm
Relative changes in the consumer price 
index (CPI)
Bank of International Settlement 
(BIS) -
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“x”, which represent tranquil months in terms of yield curve fitting. We expect the 
observed yields during tranquil periods to be roughly “in line” across the entire 
yield curve, so that the curve fitting process works well. Contrarily, in November 
2008, we expect high levels of dispersion in bond yields over the entire yield curve, 
leading to a higher noise and a higher level of illiquidity. Observed bond yields 
with a higher maturity are approximately in line. As the higher maturity bond 
yields do not seem to capture a lot of information for our illiquidity measure, we 
focus on the first 15 years in the following analysis of the plots of the respective 
ASEAN-5 countries. For Indonesia and the Philippines, there is a lack of observed 
yields within the mid-term yield curve in November 2008.
Figure 1.
Estimated model-implied Yield and market-observed Yield Curves
The figure plots estimated model-implied yield curves, shown as solid lines, and the market-observed bond yields, 
marked by “+”, “o” or “x” for countries Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand are estimated 
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These “gaps” might be a problem, since information for the missing interval 
of maturities are not considered in our illiquidity measure. Moreover, the yield 
curve of the Philippines “slips away” from the observed yields after the gap. Thus, 
an increase in noise does not arise from dispersion in long-term maturity bond 
yields, but from bad curve fitting. We assume this could be due to either the gaps 
within the yield curve and/or a lack of computing capacity. Despite this problem, 
the graph also shows a way higher dispersion in bond yields up to ten years 
maturity for November 2008 compared to the other months. Thus, the results of 
noise still follow the right intuition, however, the level might be a little overstated. 
Contrarily, the yield curve fitting process for the tranquil months works well for 
Indonesia and the Philippines.
For Singapore, the yield curves in November 2008 and April 2017 move freely 
at the very short end, showing a big downswing, proceeding from a high level 
that does not fit the rest of the yield curve. The free movement at the very short 
end arises from a lack of data for yields with low maturities. Despite the fact that 
we have no information from the short end of the yield curve for our illiquidity 
measure, the lack of short maturity bond yields does not affect our measure, as 
we do not calculate deviations when no yields are observed. More importantly, 
the rest of the yield curves and the observed yields for Singapore show that the 
increases in noise, during the financial crisis, were not a result of poor curve fitting 
on this month. Instead, they were caused by high levels of dispersion in bond 
yields across the yield curve, while the observed yields during tranquil months 
were more in line. This important fact can also be discovered for Thailand. For 
Malaysia the yield curve fitting works quite well, despite showing more noise in 
September 2014. 
B. Illiquidity (Noise) Measure
Next, we analyse the estimated illiquidity measures for the various markets. Figure 
2 illustrates the monthly evolution of sovereign bond illiquidity, Noisejm, while 
Table 2 presents key descriptive statistics of monthly sovereign bond illiquidity 
and changes in sovereign bond illiquidity, ΔNoisejm. The plot of illiquidity levels, 
shown in Figure 2, provides very heterogeneous results. The empirical result 
of Singapore’s sovereign bond market noise follows our a priori expectations, 
jumping up to its maximum of roughly 87 basis points during the global financial 
crisis, while fluctuating around a low level of roughly 5 basis points after the crisis, 
showing the lowest level of noise during tranquil periods of all the ASEAN-5 bond 
markets. 
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Figure 2.
Monthly Evolution of Sovereign Bond Illiquidity in ASEAN Countries
The plots contain Noisejm in basis points for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The sample 
period is from January 2008 to January 2019, except for Malaysia which starts on August 2009.
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Figure 2.
Monthly Evolution of Sovereign Bond Illiquidity in ASEAN Countries (Continued)
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Contrarily, the time variation of noise levels for all other ASEAN-5 countries 
are difficult to interpret. The results of the Philippines and Thailand show a higher 
level of noise of around 40 basis points during the financial crisis. However, after 
the financial crisis there are plenty of jumps in noise, which cannot be linked to 
a market-wide liquidity event, contrary to our a priori expectations. Furthermore, 
Thailand shows a lower average level of noise (17.6 basis points) compared to 
the Philippines (23.8 basis points), whereas the standard deviation of Thailand is 
higher. 
The noise level results of Indonesia show the highest level of discontinuity, 
spiking up and plummeting frequently within a range from around 5 to 68 basis 
points, while showing a mean of 23.1 basis points. For Malaysia, the noise level 
results also indicate high fluctuation around the highest mean of all countries (27.3 
basis points). As there are no bond observations before August 2009, we cannot 
compare these tranquil period results to the global financial crisis. Moreover, the 
descriptive statistics of Malaysia can hardly be compared to the other countries as 
they are based on a different sample period. For all countries, except for Malaysia, 
the Jarque-Bera statistics imply that the empirical distribution of noise levels 
deviates strongly from the normal distribution. 
Besides the fact that the noise level results for Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand deviate quite far from our expectations, our empirical 
results for these markets show jumps in noise during the financial crisis. These 
results indicate a potential, economically plausible explanation for the unexpected 
time series variation in noise. While Singapore has the highest possible credit 
rating (i.e. Aaa) on sovereign bonds throughout the whole sample period, and 
can, thus, be treated as a safe haven, the remaining countries have a weaker rating. 
In addition, arbitrageurs also account for basic market liquidity, which can be 
determined by market size and tightness (bid/ask spread). Therefore, the safe 
haven rating and a higher level of basic liquidity in Singapore’s sovereign bond 
market could also explain why in tranquil periods small deviations in this yield 
curve are eliminated by arbitrage immediately, while there are a delayed reaction 
and higher yield curve deviations in the other markets (Singapore’s average noise 
level is 10.77, which is also the lowest among all ASEAN-5 countries, see Table 2). 
In addition, Table 2 presents some further descriptive statistics about the 
monthly changes in noise, ΔNoisejm. Since we calculate our measure in basis points, 
the mean of the noise changes is very close to zero for all countries. Moreover, 
for all countries, the Jarque-Bera statistic reveals that the empirical distribution 
deviates strongly from the normal distribution. The kurtosis of Singapore and 
the Philippines is higher than three, which indicates a leptokurtic distribution. 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore are characterized by a negative skewness, 
while Singapore shows the highest absolute level of skewness (-2.811). Since the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests 
indicate that the noise levels for Singapore are not stationary, we use the changes 
in noise instead of levels for further empirical analysis. The reported unit root test 
statistics clearly confirm the absence of a unit root in noise changes. In addition, 
we find that noise changes are quite weakly correlated between the countries, 
whereas the correlation matrix of the noise levels shows mild correlations between 
the pairs Singapore/Malaysia and Singapore/Thailand. 
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C. Drivers of Illiquidity 
In this section, we study the explanatory power of potential illiquidity drivers. 
For this purpose, we estimate Eq. (3) for each ASEAN-5 sovereign bond market. 
In addition, we impose AR(1) and AR(2) terms in the regression to account for 
potential serial correlation. Moreover, we consider two different sample periods. 
The first sample period, which is used in Table 3, spans from January 2008 to January 
2019 and includes the global financial crisis as a market-wide liquidity event. Since 
the Malaysian bond data is not available throughout the whole sample period, 
we exclude the country from the first estimation in order to obtain comparable 
results. The second sample period, which is used in Table 4, is from August 2009 to 
January 2019 and includes all ASEAN countries, while not considering a market-
wide liquidity event. Since not all potential illiquidity drivers have the same units, 
we standardize any time series by using its sample mean and standard deviation. 
In order to achieve a reliable inference on statistical significance of the results, 
we estimate heteroskedasticity and serial correlation adjusted standard errors of 
Newey and West (1987) throughout all the regression specifications. We use the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) to examine whether the outcomes, given in Tables 
3 and 4, are distorted by multicollinearity. Unreported results reveal that for all 
explanatory variables, VIFj<5 holds, therefore, there is no severe multicollinearity 
in our model.
Given Table 3, we find that our regression model for Singapore has the highest 
explanatory power, exhibiting an adjusted R² of nearly 28%. In addition, for this 
model, all estimated signs of significant variables and at the same time most of the 
estimated signs of all explanatory variables are in line with the expected signs. This 
is not the case for the rest of the countries, which is not surprising as illiquidity in 
these countries is more noise driven. 
Table 3. 
Illiquidity Drivers Including the Global Financial Crisis
The table shows estimated β-coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) of Eq. (3) for the monthly changes in noise 
measure for Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. For Singapore, we estimate two regressions: 
Singapore (1) comprises the same variables as all other countries, while Singapore (2) replaces the common variable 
ΔEPUm with the country-specific variable ΔEPUmSing. The standard errors of the t-statistics are calculated by the 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance estimator of Newey and West (1987). The regression 
coefficients are standardized. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. The 
sample period is from January 2008 to January 2019. 
Variable Indonesia Philippines Singapore (1) Singapore (2) Thailand
Panel A: Common Variables
ΔCBSm -0.0584 1.0886** 3.1662*** 3.2007*** 0.0848
(-0.08) (2.29) (6.18) (6.29) (0.17)
ΔEPUm -0.7417 -1.3487*** 0.7948** - 0.6051
(-0.87) (-3.07) (2.50) - (1.10)
ΔBondVm 1.0080 1.0003* 0.6558 0.6308 0.1626
(0.93) (1.80) (1.21) (1.12) (0.36)
ΔSlopem 0.4325 -0.4010 0.4866 0.5101 1.7449**
(0.26) (-0.95) (1.35) (1.43) (2.11)
ΔVIXm 0.2081 -1.1106** -0.4409 -0.4335 0.2977
(0.24) (-2.50) (-0.82) (-0.83) (0.39)
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Variable Indonesia Philippines Singapore (1) Singapore (2) Thailand
Panel B: Country-specific Variables
ΔEPUmSing - - - 0.9138*** -
- - - (3.03) -
REjm 0.5543 -12.1613 0.0366 0.0781 -0.5566
(0.56) (-1.22) (0.05) (0.10) (-0.87)
RGjm 0.6461 -15.1860* -0.1744 -0.1772 0.1763
(0.68) (-1.69) (-0.46) (-0.46) (0.23)
ΔGDPjm -0.4506 -3.6694 -1.4074*** -1.4462*** -0.3829
(-0.48) (-0.39) (-3.05) (-3.15) (-0.94)
ΔInflationjm 1.0219 29.1179 -0.3869 -0.3847 -0.5904
(0.97) (0.33) (-1.06) (-1.09) (-1.28)
∆Noisejm-1 -8.2982*** -2.4804*** 0.3219 0.3291 -4.8373***
(-9.58) (-4.21) (1.01) (1.00) (-5.21)
∆Noisejm-2 -3.9567*** -0.9891* 0.4971 0.4798 -2.6267***
(-3.47) (-1.88) (0.88) (0.84) (-3.29)
R² 0.2954 0.3167 0.3391 0.3430 0.3224
Adjusted R² 0.2297 0.2530 0.2775 0.2818 0.2592
Observations 130 130 130 130 130
Table 3. 
Illiquidity Drivers Including the Global Financial Crisis (Continued)
We start with the results of the common variables. The changes in corporate 
bond spreads are highly significant for Singapore and significant (at the 5 percent 
level) for the Philippines with the expected positive sign. This result seems highly 
sensible, since one of the fundamental causes of the global financial crisis was a 
credit boom (Acharya and Richardson, 2009). Global economic policy uncertainty 
is significant for the Philippines and Singapore, showing the expected positive 
sign for Singapore and an unexpected negative sign for the Philippines. The 
result for Singapore complies with the theory that uncertainty reduces liquidity 
provision in financial markets. Concerning the relation between changes in 
implied bond volatility and changes in noise, we find a significant and expectedly 
positive relation for the Philippines, which is significant at the 10 percent level. 
For changes in the term structure slope, we find a significant positive result for 
Thailand. Finally, changes in VIX are significantly negatively related to changes in 
noise for the Philippines, opposing our expectations.
We continue by examining the estimation results of the country-specific 
variables. The Singapore-specific changes in economic policy uncertainty, which 
are only used in model “Singapore (2)”, show a higher expectedly positive 
significance than changes in global economic policy uncertainty. This indicates 
that the noise measure also captures some information about the country-specific 
liquidity conditions. Local equity returns are not significant in any of the ASEAN-5 
sovereign bond markets, while the GDP growth rate is highly significant, showing 
an expectedly negative sign in Singapore. Thus, the business cycle might be more 
related to our illiquidity measure than the more forward-looking local business 
climate. Concerning the relation between the local gold return and changes 
Drivers of Illiquidity in The ASEAN Sovereign Bond Market 519
in noise, we only find a single negative relation for the Philippines, which is 
significant at the 10 percent level. The negative coefficient is not in line with the 
theoretical expectation. In times of a market-wide liquidity stress event, investors 
might be forced to sell some or all of their holdings, which can lead to a decline 
in returns. The inflation rate, as our second macroeconomic variable, is not 
significant in any of the countries. Given its forward-looking character, following 
the assumptions of the Phillips Curve, the results are consistent with the findings 
for the local business climate (expressed by local equity returns). Thus, the 
aggregate business cycle might be a more important macroeconomic explanatory 
variable than the inflation rate. For Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, we 
report negative autocorrelation, which is highly significant. This underlines our 
considerations in the previous section econometrically that the results in noise 
for these countries are not persistent as expected, but mean reverse. Overall, we 
find consistent econometric results for Singapore. The main driver of illiquidity in 
Singapore’s sovereign bond market is the corporate bond spread, as a proxy for 
the aggregate credit cycle. Moreover, an increase in economic policy uncertainty 
and declines in the aggregate business cycle significantly drive sovereign bond 
illiquidity in Singapore. For Indonesia, the only explanatory variables that drive 
illiquidity are negative autocorrelation of first and second order, reflecting the 
mean reverse results of noise. The Philippines and Thailand are also driven by 
negative autocorrelation. However, in these sovereign bond markets, we can also 
identify some significant explainable variables, where the signs of the coefficients 
follow our theoretical expectations. 
Table 4 includes the information on the Malaysian sovereign bond market, 
while excluding the global financial crisis event. By not considering any market-
wide liquidity event within this sample period, our results show that changes 
in noise are mainly driven by negative autocorrelation in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Thailand, implying a mean reversion in noise changes. In the 
Philippines, first order autocorrelation is negative at the 5 percent level. Indonesia 
and Malaysia do not show any other illiquidity driver, while, for the Philippines, 
changes in global economic policy uncertainty are significant at the 5 percent level 
and negatively related to changes in noise, opposing our theoretical expectations. 
The contradicting sign of global economic policy uncertainty for the Philippines 
may be explained by a paradigm shift in foreign direct investments due to a 
shrinking share of U.S. direct investment in the total share of the Philippines 
foreign direct investments in the recent years as well as increased risk aversion 
in the region. The changes in corporate bond spread for Singapore turn from a 
highly significant positive result in Table 3 to a significant negative result in Table 
4. During the global financial crisis, illiquidity in Singapore’s sovereign bond 
market increased sharply and declined quickly afterwards to its normal level 
(see Figure 2). This might explain the sign change as both corporate bond yield 
spreads as well as the illiquidity of Singapore sovereign bond market are at a high 
level during the global financial crisis. However, in tranquil periods, Singapore’s 
sovereign bond market is very liquid and therefore its illiquidity is negatively 
related to the corporate bond market. Lastly, changes in term structure slope are 
highly significant in Thailand and significant at the 5 percent level in Singapore, 
showing opposite signs. Overall, we find very few significant variables and most 
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of them are contrary to the theoretical expectations. The Singapore sovereign 
bond market, especially, shows completely opposing results compared to the 
first sample period, which included the global financial crisis. However, these are 
not bad results at all, as they indicate that our explanatory variables can explain 
illiquidity jumps during a market-wide illiquidity event but not the fluctuation of 
noise on a very low level during tranquil periods. 
Table 4.
Illiquidity Drivers Excluding a Market-Wide Liquidity Event
The table shows estimated β-coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) of Eq. (3) for the monthly changes in the 
noise measure for Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. For Singapore, we estimate two regressions: 
Singapore (1) comprises the same variables as all other countries, while Singapore (2) replaces the common variable 
ΔEPUm with the country-specific variable ΔEPUmSing. The standard errors of the t-statistics are calculated by the 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance estimator of Newey and West (1987). The regression 
coefficients are standardized. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. The 
sample period is from August 2009 to January 2019.
Variable Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore (1)
Singapore 
(2) Thailand
Panel A: Common Variables
ΔCBSm -0.1238 -0.7757 0.4774 -0.396** -0.386** 0.6619
(-0.09) (-0.91) (0.79) (-2.16) (-2.12) (1.30)
ΔEPUm 0.0611 -0.3622 -1.1566** 0.1973 - 0.9997
(0.07) (-0.46) (-2.12) (1.17) - (1.57)
ΔBondVm 0.1078 -0.2674 0.5111 0.0487 0.0390 -0.1585
(0.09) (-0.46) (0.68) (0.23) (0.18) (-0.24)
ΔSlopem 1.2456 -1.0929 -0.1209 -0.4026** -0.3871** 2.1828***
(0.68) (-1.66) (-0.28) (-2.45) (-2.43) (2.78)
ΔVIXm 0.8346 0.6735 -0.9039* 0.2263 0.2224 0.5277
(0.84) (0.88) (-1.91) (1.11) (1.09) (0.81)
Panel B: Country-specific Variables
ΔEPUmSing - - - - 0.2547 -
- - - - (1.52) -
REjm 0.8599 -0.1266 -16.7762 -0.2606 -0.2446 -0.4125
(0.73) (-0.13) (-1.38) (-1.48) (-1.41) (-0.63)
RGjm 1.0943 0.5576 -10.9196 -0.0807 -0.0826 0.0371
(1.08) (0.67) (-1.1) (-0.51) (-0.54) (0.05)
ΔGDPjm -0.2717 -0.1643 -15.6224 0.2530 0.2366 -0.5235
(-0.29) (-0.28) (-1.53) (1.26) (1.21) (-0.94)
ΔInflationjm 1.3826 -0.6164 -7.5476 -0.0271 -0.0309 -0.2532
(1.48) (-1.01) (-0.05) (-0.14) (-0.16) (-0.44)
∆Noisejm-1 -8.001*** -5.393*** -1.6587** -1.341*** -1.330*** -6.081***
(-8.00) (-4.20) (-2.52) (-8.92) (-8.83) (-9.37)
∆Noisejm-2 -3.995*** -2.403*** -0.1556 -1.090*** -1.0791*** -3.409***
(-3.50) (-5.10) (-0.31) (-6.25) (-6.16) (-4.59)
R² 0.3129 0.3377 0.2430 0.4401 0.4443 0.4366
Adjusted R² 0.2366 0.2641 0.1589 0.3778 0.3826 0.3740
Observations 111 111 111 111 111 111
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FINDINGS
The previous literature using price deviations in the yield curve as a measure of 
illiquidity mostly focuses on illiquidity conditions in the largest and highest rated 
sovereign bond markets of developed countries. We contribute to the existing 
literature by analyzing the ASEAN-5 sovereign markets, which are much smaller 
than the U.S. market (see Footnote 1). This aspect is very important for investors as 
bond liquidity is one of the major drivers of sovereign bond yields (Kinateder and 
Wagner, 2017). Our results show that illiquidity conditions between the ASEAN-5 
sovereign bond markets are heterogeneous in many ways.
Firstly, illiquidity conditions in Singapore are closely related to those of 
the largest sovereign bond markets, such as the U.S. (Hu et al., 2013) and Japan 
(Hattori, 2019), implying a low liquidity risk exposure for investors during tranquil 
periods and significant risk premiums in a market-wide liquidity event (i.e. the 
global financial crisis). In addition, illiquidity in Singapore is driven by economic 
variables that were also found by previous studies (see e.g., Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen, 2009; Gilchrist et al., 2009; Nagel, 2012; Adrian et al., 2017). Secondly, 
noise in the remaining ASEAN-5 sovereign bond markets is significantly 
higher during tranquil periods compared to Singapore and arbitrage eliminates 
larger deviations not immediately but in a delayed manner, indicating that the 
risk exposure to liquidity is on average higher for investors and can hardly be 
anticipated by changes in economic drivers.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper examines illiquidity conditions during the period January 2008 
to January 2019 in five ASEAN sovereign bond markets, namely Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, by exploiting price deviations 
in the yield curve, based on the noise measure introduced by Hu et al. (2013). 
The application of an innovative bond-specific noise measure to the ASEAN-5 
sovereign bond markets distinguishes our work from earlier studies. Furthermore, 
we apply a multiple regression using a comprehensive set of explanatory 
variables in order to identify the drivers of illiquidity in the respective markets. 
Our results for Singapore show that the noise measure in this specific market is 
related to three economic drivers. The main driver is the corporate bond spread, 
as a proxy for the aggregate credit cycle, while at the same time an increase in 
economic policy uncertainty and declines in the aggregate business cycle, proxied 
by GDP growth rate, significantly drive sovereign bond illiquidity in Singapore. 
By studying two different sample periods, we find that our explanatory variables 
can explain illiquidity jumps in Singapore during a market-wide illiquidity event 
but not the fluctuation of noise on a very low level during tranquil periods. Our 
empirical results for Singapore also indicate that the noise measure does not only 
contain market-wide information, but also unique country-specific information, 
which is in line with the deliberations of Durham (2015). However, illiquidity 
of the remainder ASEAN-5 sovereign bond markets is mostly characterized by 
negative autocorrelation and not by economic drivers. The illiquidity in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand might react in a delayed manner as 
markets have lower credit ratings and basic liquidity, which may reduce the 
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number of international arbitrageurs. This possible explanation could be a topic 
for future research that may address this issue in more detail. 
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